Rawls, Harsanyi, Binmore. Una bibliografía.

Las bibliografías filosóficamente relevantes de John Rawls, John Harsanyi y Ken Binmore.

El primero es relevante por la revolución que supuso su Theory of Justice para la Filosofía, por popularizar el concepto de equilibro reflexivo, la proposición de la regla minimax para decisión en incertidumbre, su rechazo al utilitarismo, y en obras posteriores, su idea de justificación pública.

El segundo, Harsanyi, lo contrapongo a Rawls en tanto es un utilitarista, y criticó el principio minimax adoptado por Rawls.

Binmore puede verse como una síntesis de Harsanyi y Rawls, y como la culminación del proyecto de intentar fundar una filosofía política en campos como la teoría de juegos, o la teoría de la elección racional.

A fecha de hoy he leído los artículos referentes a Rawls. Espero leer los demás en un futuro.

John Rawls

Rawls, J. (1951). Outline of a decision procedure for ethics. The Philosophical Review, 177-197.

Rawls, J. (1971). A theory of justice. Harvard university press.

Rawls, J. (1980). Kantian constructivism in moral theory. The journal of philosophy, 515-572.

Rawls, J. (1985). Justice as fairness: political not metaphysical. Philosophy & Public Affairs, 223-251.

Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. Columbia University Press.

Rawls, J., Habermas, J.,  & Vallespín, F. (1998).Debate sobre el liberalismo político. Paidos.

Rawls, J. (1998). A Kantian conception of equality.Cambridge Review, 119, 36-41.

Rawls, J. (1999). The law of peoples: with, the idea of public reason revisited. Harvard University Press.

Rawls, J. (Ed.). (2001). Justice as fairness: A restatement. Harvard University Press.

John Harsanyi

Harsanyi, J. C. (1953). Cardinal utility in welfare economics and in the theory of risk-taking. The Journal of Political Economy, 61(5), 434.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1956). Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory of games: a critical discussion of Zeuthen’s, Hicks’, and Nash’s theories. Econometrica, Journal of the Econometric Society, 144-157.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1975). Can the maximin principle serve as a basis for morality? A critique of John Rawls’s theory. American political science review,69(02), 594-606.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1975). Nonlinear social welfare functions. Theory and Decision,6(3), 311-332.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1976). Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility (pp. 6-23). Springer Netherlands.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1976). Ethics in Terms of Hypothetical Imperatives. In Essays on Ethics, Social Behavior, and Scientific Explanation (pp. 24-36). Springer Netherlands.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1977). Morality and the theory of rational behavior. Social Research, 623-656.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1978). Sneed on Rawls’s theory of social institutions: Some comments. Erkenntnis,13(1), 225-230.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1978). Bayesian decision theory and utilitarian ethics. The American Economic Review, 223-228.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1978). Rationality, Reasons, Hypothetical Imperatives, and Morality. Center for Research in Management Science, University of California, Berkeley.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1979). Bayesian decision theory, rule utilitarianism, and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.Theory and Decision, 11(3), 289-317.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1979). Bayesian decision theory, rule utilitarianism, and Arrow’s impossibility theorem.Theory and Decision, 11(3), 289-317.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1980). Rule utilitarianism, rights, obligations and the theory of rational behavior.Theory and Decision, 12(2), 115-133.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1982). Some Epistemological Advantages of a Rule Utilitarian Position in Ethics.Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 7(1), 389-402.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1983). Basic moral decisions and alternative concepts of rationality. Social Theory and Practice, 231-244.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1984). Utilitarian morality in a world of very half-hearted altruists. Center for Research in Management, University of California, Berkeley.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1985). Does reason tell us what moral code to follow and, indeed, to follow any moral code at all?. Ethics, 42-55.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1985). Rule utilitarianism, equality, and justice. Social Philosophy and Policy, 2(02), 115-127.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1986). Rational behaviour and bargaining equilibrium in games and social situations. CUP Archive.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1986). Individual utilities and utilitarian ethics (pp. 1-12). Physica-Verlag HD.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1987). The tracing procedure: A self-correcting reasoning procedure. Theory and decision,23(1), 7-23.

Harsanyi, J. (1987). Morals by Agreement, A Review Article on David Gauthier’s Book of the Same Title.Economics and Philosophy, 339, 373.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1988). Some Recent Developments in Game Theory. In Theory and Decision (pp. 235-260). Springer Netherlands.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1988). Problems with act-utilitarianism and with malevolent preferences.

Harsanyi, J. (1988) Democracy, Equality, and Popular Consent. Ian Shapiro and Grant Reeher (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), 279.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1991). Equality, responsibility, and justice as seen from a utilitarian perspective. Theory and Decision, 31(2-3), 141-158.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1992). In defense of game theory.Rationality and Society, 4(1), 51-61.

Harsanyi, J. (1992). Game and decision theoretic models in ethics.

Harsanyi, J. (1993). Expectation Effects, Individual Utilities, and Rational Desires. Rationality, Rules, and Utility. New Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Richard B. Brandt/Ed. by B. Hooker. Oxford, 115-126.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1993). 15 Normative Validity and Meaning of von Neumann—Morgenstern Utilities.Frontiers of game theory, 307.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1996). Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods. Social choice and welfare, 14(1), 129-145.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1996). Morality and incentives.Ethics, Rationality and Economic Behaviour (Clarendon, Oxford), 22-35.

Harsanyi, J. C. (1996). Utilities, preferences, and substantive goods. Social choice and welfare, 14(1), 129-145.

Harsanyi, J. C. (2007). The logical structure of philosophical errors. Economics and Philosophy,23(03), 349-357.

Ken Binmore

Binmore, K. G. (1984). Bargaining conventions.International Journal of Game Theory, 13(4), 193-200.

Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1985). Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: A preliminary study. The American Economic Review, 1178-1180.

Binmore, K. G. (1987). Why game theory” doesn’t work”.

Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1988). A further test of noncooperative bargaining theory: Reply. The American Economic Review, 837-839.

Binmore, K. (1989). Social Contract I: Harsanyi and Rawls. The Economic Journal, 84-102.

Binmore, K. (1990). Evolution and utilitarianism: Social contract III.Constitutional Political Economy,1(2), 1-26.

Binmore, K., Morgan, P., Snaked, A., & Sutton, J. (1991). Do people exploit their bargaining power? An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior,3(3), 295-322.

Binmore, K. (1991). Rational Choice Theory: Sufficient but not necessary.

Binmore, K. (1991). Game theory and the social contract. In Game Equilibrium Models II (pp. 85-163). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

Binmore, K. (1993). “Bargaining and morality: social contract II en Rationality, Justice and the Social Contract Themes From Morals by Agreement: Themes from ‘Morals by Agreement.

Binmore, K. G. (1992). Social contract iv: convention and evolution.

Binmore, K. G. (1993). Game theory and the social contracts I: Playing Fair (Vol. 1). Mit Press.

Binmore, K., & Samuelson, L. (1994). An economist’s perspective on the evolution of norms.Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 45-63.

Binmore, K. (1996). Right or seemly?. Analyse & Kritik, 18(1), 67-80.

Binmore, K. G. (1998). Game theory and the social contract: just playing (Vol. 2). Mit Press.

Binmore, K. G. (1998). The evolution of fairness norms. Rationality and Society,10(3), 275-301.

Binmore, K. (1998). A utilitarian theory of political legitimacy. Economics, Values and Organization.

Binmore, K. (1998). Egalitarianism versus utilitarianism. Utilitas, 10(03), 353-367.

Binmore, K. (1999). Game theory and business ethics. Business Ethics Quarterly, 9(01), 31-35.

Binmore, K. (2001). Natural justice and political stability. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 133-151.

Binmore, K., Swierzbinski, J., & Proulx, C. (2001). Does minimax work? An experimental study. The Economic Journal, 111(473), 445-464.

Binmore, K. (2001). How and why did fairness norms evolve?. In Proceedings of the British Academy (Vol. 110, pp. 149-170). Oxford University Press.

Binmore, K. (2004). 8 The Breakdown of Social Contracts. Social dynamics, 4, 213.

Binmore, K. (2004). Reciprocity and the social contract. politics, philosophy & economics, 3(1), 5-35.

Binmore, K. (2004). Guillermo Owen’s proof of the minimax theorem. In Essays in Cooperative Games(pp. 19-23). Springer US.

Binmore, K. (2005). Natural justice. Oxford University Press.

Binmore, K. (2005). Economic man–or straw man?.Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28(06), 817-818.

Binmore, K. (2006). Why do people cooperate?.Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 5(1), 81-96.

McNamara, J. M., Binmore, K., & Houston, A. I. (2006). Cooperation should not be assumed. Trends in ecology & evolution, 21(9), 476-478.

Binmore, K. (2007). Can knowledge be justified true belief?.

Binmore, K. (2006). Justice as a natural phenomenon. In Symposium on Kenneth Binmore’s” Natural Justice (Vol. 28, No. 1).

Binmore, K. (2007). The origins of fair play.

Binmore, K. (2007). Interpersonal comparison of utility.

Binmore, K. (2007). Rational decisions in large worlds. Annales d’Economie et de Statistique, 25-41.

Binmore, K. G. (2007). Does game theory work? The bargaining challenge.

Binmore, K. (2008). Do conventions need to be common knowledge?. Topoi,27(1-2), 17-27.

Binmore, K. G. (2008). Naturalizing Harsanyi and Rawls.

Binmore, K. (2008). Rational decisions. Princeton University Press.

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